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Bockus: Retaliatory Eviction in Texas - An Analysis and a Proposal.

RETALIATORY EVICTION IN TEXAS-AN ANALYSIS
AND A PROPOSAL
JANE E. BOCKUS
At early common law a lease was considered to represent the sale of an
estate for a term of years.' Consequently, the tenant under a lease, like the
vendee in a conveyance of real property, took subject to the doctrine of
caveat emptor. Since the tenant's rights stemmed from property law, :' the
contract remedies of mutually dependent covenants and implied warranties were not available.' As a result, if the dwelling on the leased land was
totally uninhabitable or even if it was destroyed, the tenant remained
liable for the rent.' The only implied covenants in a lease agreement were
the promise of the tenant to pay the rent and the promise of the landlord
to provide quiet enjoyment.' Since the transfer of possession of land was
the main purpose of a lease,7 these implied covenants were sufficient to
protect the interests of both parties.'
URBANIZATION AND THE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP

This system worked well in an agrarian society in which most lease
agreements involved tracts of farm land.' The lessee-farmer was generally
1. See C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 65-69 (1962).
2. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45, at 267 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
3. 3 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1 110, at :377
(repl. 1959).
4. Id. § 1129, at 471. The covenants were considered independent, so even if'the landlord

failed to deliver possession the tenant was still bound to pay the rent. Quinn & Phillips, The
Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future,
38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 228 (1969); see 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45, at 267 (A.J.
Casner ed. 1952); C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 70-71 (1962); 6
S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 890, at 580-89 (3d ed. 1962). No implied
warranty that the dwelling was habitable or fit for its intended use at the time of the lease
agreement existed at common law. Thus the tenant could not allege unfitness oft he dwelling
as the basis of a suit against his lessor or as a defense in an action by the landlord for rent. 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45, at 267 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). 5. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 70-71 (1962).
6. See 3 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1129, at
472 (repl. 1959). The legal implications of a covenant for quiet enjoyment are that the landlord has an adequate title to the leasehold estate and that the tenant will be permitted to
enjoy his interest without disturbance. Id. at 471; see L-M-S Inc. v. Blackwell, 149 Tex. 348,

354, 233 S.W.2d 286, 289 (1950).
7. Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 708 (1974). See also
3 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1129, at 468-71 (repl.
1959).
8. Hicks, The ContractualNature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REv. 443, 445
(1972).
9. Id. at 445.
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self-sufficient and needed no more from his landlord than quiet peace and
enjoyment."' The industrial revolution, however, with its consequent urbanization, resulted in many significant changes in the landlord-tenant
relationship." The average tenant was less capable of making needed repairs,' 2 and dwelling facilities became more complex, requiring greater
sophistication to repair." Unlike the rural farmer, the urban dweller could
not realistically be expected to make all necessary repairs.' Legally, however, the tenant was still responsible for them.'5
Another effect of industrialization was the increasing need for a large
labor force in a centralized area.'" The migration to the cities gave rise to
a housing market so tight that many tenants had no choice but to accept
a tenancy on whatever terms the landlord dictated.' 7 Frequently, an oral
agreement creating a periodic tenancy resulted.' The duties of the landlord under such an agreement were merely those prescribed by common
law.'" In return for paying rent every week or month, the tenant received a
place to live.'
In crowded urban areas, dwellings deteriorated more rapidly than they
10. See ABF, MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, Introduction at 6 (Tent. Draft
1969) Ihereinafter cited as MRLTC].
11. Id. at 6. The industrial revolution initiated a major migration to the cities. Lesar,
The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective: From Status to Contract and Back in 900
Years?, 9 U. KAN. L. REV. 369, 372 (1961).
12. Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective: From Status to Contract and
Back in 900 Years?, 9 U. KAN. L. REV. 369, 373-74 (1961).
13. MRLTC, supra note 10, at 6.
14. Id. at 6; see Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective: From Status to
Contract and Back in 900 Years?, 9 U. KAN. L. REV. 369, 373-74 (1961).
15. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 378, at 347 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); see Lesar,
Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (1960). Absent an express agreement to the contrary, a landlord in Texas has no duty to repair any defect in the premises.
See Morton v. Burton-Lingo Co., 136 Tex. 263, 266, 150 S.W.2d 239, 241 (1941); Kallison v.
Ellison, 430 S.W.2d 839, 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, no writ).
16. See Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 1254, 1254-55 (1966).
17. Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEO. L.J.
519, 520 (1966).
18. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 253 (1977). A substantial portion of the
population presently lives under this type of tenancy. Id. There are three basic types of
tenancies. An estate for years lasts for a specified period of time and terminates without
notice. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.13 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). A periodic tenancy
continues from term to term and is automatically renewed until proper notice of termination
is given. The tenancy is created when the parties do not fix the duration of the tenancy or
when a tenant holds over after the expiration of a lease. Id. § 3.23. A tenancy at will arises
when the parties agree that either may terminate the tenancy at any time without notice.
Id. § 3.28.
19. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.1 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
20. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 253 (1977).
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could be replaced.2 Low income tenants, having no bargaining position as
a result of housing shortages, were forced to accept substandard housing.22
In an attempt to mitigate this problem, many legislatures established
housing codes." Such codes did little, however, to improve the tenant's
position because he was still liable for the rent whether his apartment was
habitable or not.2" Further, if a periodic tenant reported housing code
violations in an attempt to improve the condition of his dwelling, he was
vulnerable to eviction2" because the landlord could evict for any reason
simply by giving notice. 7
MODERN REFORMS IN THE COMMON LAW

Many courts and legislatures have realized that the agrarian concept of
landlord-tenant law does not adequately represent the needs of the modern
tenant.2" Resultant changes in the law have done much to reduce the
harshness of the common law doctrine of caveat emptor. 21 Warranties and
remedies for the tenant as well as housing codes to be enforced by local
authorities have been created.30 To implement and protect these newly
21. 3 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1129, at 468
(repl. 1959).
22. Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEO. L.J.
519, 521 (1966).
23. Comment, California's Common Law Defense Against Landlord Retaliatory
Conduct, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1975). See generally Gribetz & Grad, Housing ('ode
Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254 (1966). Congress provided
additional motivation for the enactment of housing codes with the Housing Act of 1954,
section 303, as amended. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1451(c) (West Supp. 1978). This act made a
workable program for the prevention of the spread of slums a prerequisite to obtaining urban
renewal loans and grants and other federal assistance. Id.
24. See,generally Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801
(1965); Comment, Housing Codes and a Tort of Slumlordism, 8 Hous. L. REV. 522 (1971).
25. See C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 71 (1962).
26. See Aluli v. Trusdell, 508 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Hawaii), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1040
(1973); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236a (Vernon Supp. 1978). This statute provides for
the termination of a periodic tenancy, by the giving of proper notice. The landlord need not
show a reason for termination.
27. See, e.g., Snitman v. Goodman, 118 A.2d 394, 398 (D.C. 1955); Fowel v. Continental
Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 205, 207 (D.C. 1947); Gabriel v. Borowy, 85 N.E.2d 435, 438 (Mass.
1949).
28. E.g., Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 708 (1974);
Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex. 1978); Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409,
413 (Wis. 1961). "The need and social desirability of adequate housing for people in this era
of rapid population increases is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal cliche,
caveat emptor. "Id. at 413. See also CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1941, 1942 (Deering 1972); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 5321.04, .07 (Baldwin Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 (Supp.
1977).
29. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45, at 267 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); Hicks, The
ContractualNature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443, 489-98 (1972).
30. See Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 708 (1974)
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created tenant rights, courts have developed the defense of retaliatory
eviction.:" If a landlord initiates an eviction proceeding after a tenant takes
advantage of his remedies or reports code violations, the tenant may defend by showing that the landlord's motive was retaliatory. 2
The Judicially Created Defense of Retaliatory Eviction
Traditionally, a landlord could evict a periodic tenant for any or no
reason if proper notice was given."' With few exceptions,:" the courts upheld
this power of the landlord."5 In 1968 the landmark decision of Edwards v.
Habib"' held that a tenant could successfully defend a suit for possession
if he showed that the notice to quit was issued in retaliation for his complaints to housing authorities.:7 Two distinct theories for justifying the
retaliatory eviction defense have emerged from subsequent decisions which
have relied upon Edwards: a constitutional theory, :" and a public policy
theory."
(implied warranty of habitability in rental agreements); Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526, 535
(N.J. 1970) (tenant may repair and deduct cost from rent when landlord has failed to make
necessary repairs); TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1175, § 35 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (home-rule
cities may establish housing codes).
31. See, e.g., Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969);
Dickhut v. Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Wis. 1970).
32. Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97, 98, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729, 7,30 (1970) (tenant
evicted for exercising statutory right to repair and deduct); E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock,
281 A.2d 544, 545 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) (tenant evicted for complaining to city
health officials about lack of water pressure); Markese v. Cooper, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 65 (Monroe County Ct. 1972) (tenant evicted for reporting housing code violations).
33. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.23 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). A landlord could also
evict a tenant at will for any reason and without any notice. Id. § 3.28.
:34. Four exceptions have generally been recognized to the landlord's unfettered right to
evict a tenant. Three exceptions were set out in Edwards v. Habib: when the landlord is a
governmental body it cannot act arbitrarily towards its tenants; emergency rent control
legislation may restrict the landlord's rights; a landlord cannot evict in retaliation for the
tenant's registering to vote or actually voting. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 689-90 n.5
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). A fourth exception was recognized in
Walker v. Pointer: a landlord cannot evict for reasons of racial discrimination. Walker v.
Pointer, 304 F. Supp. 56, 63 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
35. See, e.g., Snitman v. Goodman, 118 A.2d 394, 396 (D.C. 1955); Gabriel v. Borowy,
85 N.E,2d 435, 438 (Mass. 1949); Holcomb v. Lorino, 124 Tex. 446, 454, 79 S.W.2d 307, 310
(19:35).
36. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
37. Id. at 690.
38. See, e.g., E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 281 A.2d 544, 546 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1971); Engler v. Capital Management Corp., 271 A.2d 615, 617 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1970); Church v. Allen Meadows Apts., 329 N.Y.S.2d 148, 149 (Sup. Ct. 1972). See generally
:3HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 193 (1968).
39. See, e.g., Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Markese v. Cooper, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 69 (Monroe County Ct. 1972); Dickhut v. Norton, 173
N.W.2d 297, 299 (Wis. 1970).
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Constitutional Theory. The constitutional theory is founded on the
assertion that allowing a landlord to evict a tenant in retaliation for reporting housing code violations or for exercising other protected rights violates
the first and fourteenth amendments." To prevail under this defense a
tenant must show that his constitutional rights of freedom of speech and
freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances have been
violated by his landlord.4" Additionally, a sufficient connection must be
shown between the landlord's action and the state to satisfy the color of
state law requirement necessary to invoke the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause.2 Although it has been held that judicial application of a
state's common law in a suit between private parties may constitute state
action,4" it is not clear what degree of judicial involvement is necessary to
invoke constitutional restraints." As a result of this uncertainty, many
courts have chosen not to base their decisions on the constitutional
theory ."
40. See, e.g., E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 281 A.2d 544, 546 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1971) (evicting tenant for participation in tenants' union violates his first amendment
right of freedom of speech); Engler v. Capital Management Corp., 271 A.2d 615, 617 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1970) (evicting tenant for reporting code violations or joining tenants'
union violates his first amendment rights); Church v. Allen Meadows Apts., 329 N.Y.S.2d
148, 149 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (evicting tenant for joining tenants' union is violation of his constitutional rights). But see Aluli v. Trusdell, 508 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Hawaii) (retaliatory eviction
does not violate first amendment rights), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1040 (1973).
41. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969).
42. Id. at 691; see E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 281 A.2d 544, 546 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1971); Church v. Allen Meadows Apts., 329 N.Y.S.2d 148, 149 (Sup. Ct. 1972). See
also Toms Point Apts. v. Goudzward, 339 N.Y.S.2d 281, 286 (Dist. Ct. 1972), aff'd per curim,
360 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. 1973). In Toms Point Apts., as affirmed, the court established
guidelines for proving that an eviction is retaliatory and unconstitutional. To prevail, the
tenant must prove he exercised his constitutional rights in the action he undertook; his
complaint is bona fide, reasonable, serious in nature and with foundation in fact; he did not
create the condition upon which the complaint was based; and the overriding reason for the
landlord's seeking eviction is to retaliate against the tenant for exercising his constitutional
rights. Id. at 286.
43. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). In order to meet the requirement of state action when asserting the
defense of retaliatory eviction most courts have required more than the use of the court by
the landlord in a summary eviction proceeding. Generally, the courts require that there be
additional connections between the landlord and the government. See Weigand v. Afton View
Apts., 473 F.2d 545, 547 (8th Cir. 1973) (federal financing of privately owned apartments not
sufficient connection); Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 1972) (sufficient connection
where court enforced eviction and local zoning created leasing monopoly in landlord);
McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189, 1190 (2d Cir. 1970) (receipt of federally
insured mortgage benefits by landlord not sufficient connection), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994
(1971).
44. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969). See also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64 (1972) (upheld Oregon statute which
precluded raising defense of retaliatory eviction in eviction proceedings).
45. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 393 U.S.
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Public Policy Theory. This theory is founded on the proposition that
public policy requires that tenants be free to report housing code violations
to governmental authorities without fear of eviction in retaliation for their
reports." It is generally recognized that housing codes were enacted primarily to secure safe and sanitary dwellings for the tenant. 7 Governmental
agencies charged with enforcing these codes depend heavily on the reports
of tenants for information about code violations." The effectiveness of the
codes would be significantly undermined if landlords, through retaliatory
evictions, were allowed to discourage those reports." To allow such evictions would not only punish the tenant for making a complaint he had a
constitutional right to make, but would also inhibit the enforcement of
0
codes enacted for the tenant's benefit.
Some courts have rested their public policy arguments on the theory that
the government has an obligation to protect any person reporting a violation of the law. 5' This obligation arises not only from the inherent duty of
the government to protect the individual, but also from the necessity that
the government administer and enforce an effective minimum housing
standard.52 In light of either of these public policy arguments and in view
of existing housing shortages, 53 the threat of eviction must not curtail re1016 (1969); Sims v. Century Kiest Apts., 567 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978,
no writ); Dickhut v. Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Wis. 1970).
46. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1016 (1969); Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97, 99-100, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729, 731-32
(1970); Portnoy v. Hill, 294 N.Y.S.2d 278, 281 (Binghamton City Ct. 1968).
47. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969). The court emphasized the need for protection of the slum dweller. Id. at 700; see
Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
1254, 1255 (1966); Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor Change, 54
GEO. L.J. 519, 543 (1966). In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 371 (1959), the Supreme Court
observed:
[tlhe need to maintain basic, minimal standards of housing, to prevent the spread of
disease and of the pervasive breakdown in the fiber of the people which is produced
by slums and the absence of the barest essentials of civilized living, has mounted to a
major concern of American government.

48. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969).
49. See State v. Field, 257 A.2d 127, 129 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1969); Markese v.
Cooper, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 67 (Monroe County Ct. 1972).
50. See Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97, 100, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729, 732 (1970);

Markese v. Cooper, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 67-68 (Monroe County Ct. 1972).
51. See In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535-36 (1895); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651,

657-58 (1884). See also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Sanford, 540 S.W.2d 478, 484 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ). "For the orderly functioning of our society,
people must be completely free from all forms of coercion against reporting violations of the
law." Id. at 484.
52. Sims v. Century Kiest Apts., 567 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no
writ).
53. ABA ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HOUSING & URB. GROWTH, HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER
LAW

415 (1978).
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ports of code violations from low income tenants. 4
Retaliatory Eviction as a Statutory Defense
In most jurisdictions it was the courts which were first to recognize and
initiate the defense of retaliatory eviction. 5 Today many states have enacted statutes which codify this defense. 56 Statutory defenses are an improvement over the judicially created defense because they clarify the
elements of proof necessary to raise the defense and define which acts of
the tenant are protected. 7
Several legislatures have adopted statutes" based on the standards set
out in the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act." The standards
in this Act provide that a landlord may not retaliate by increasing rent,
decreasing services, or bringing or threatening to bring an action for possession." Thus, the tenant is protected from various forms of constructive
eviction.' Other legislatures, however, have adopted statutes which only
54. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969).
55. See, e.g., Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97, 99, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729, 730 (1970); Toms Point Apts.
v. Goudzward, 360 N.Y.S.2d 366, 367 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
56. Twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have adopted statutes that allow
retaliatory eviction as a defense. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310 (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 331491 (Supp. 1977); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942.5 (Deering 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-33
(West 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 25, § 5516 (1975); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 45-1624 (West Supp.
1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.56-.60 (West Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 521-74 (1976); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1966); KAN. STAT. § 58-2572 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. §
383.705 (Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14., § 6001 (Supp. 1977); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 8-208.1 (Supp. 1977); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 186, § 18 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978) &
ch. 239, § 2A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5720 (Supp. 1978); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (West Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1439 (1976); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN, §§ 540:13-a, -b (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-10.10 to .12 (West Supp. 1978); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 70-7-39 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 230 (McKinney Supp. 1977); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.02, .03 (Baldwin Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.865 (1975); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-20-10, -11 (1970); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 53-5505 (1977) & § 64-2854 (1976); VA. CODE § 55-248.39 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.240, .250 (Supp. 1978). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY, §§ 13.8, .9 (Tent. Draft No. 4) (1976).
57. Markese v. Cooper, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 74 (Monroe County Ct. 1972). See generally
Comment, Landlord and Tenant.--Prohibitionof Retaliatory Eviction in Landlord-Tenant
Relations: A Study of Practiceand Proposals, 54 N.C. L. REV. 861, 881 (1976).
58. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310 (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 33-1491(c)(2) (Supp.
1977); KAN. STAT. § 58-2572 (1976).
59. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD &TENANT ACT § 5.101 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
URLTA].
60. Id. § 5.101(a).
61. The District of Columbia Code, for example, provides that a landlord cannot recover
possession, increase rent, decrease services, bring undue or unusual inconvenience, violate
privacy, harass, reduce the quality of service, threaten, or coerce or otherwise cause the tenant
to abandon the premises involuntarily. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 45-1624 (West Supp. 1977).
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protect a tenant in an action for possession.12 Acts of the tenant most
commonly protected include attempts to enforce legal rights, " complaints
of conditions to his landlord, 4 complaints of health, safety, or housing code
violations to a government agency, 5 or involvement in an organization of
tenants. "
In order to successfully defend under any of these statutes, it must be
established that the landlord's actions were in retaliation for an act of the
tenant. "7 Thus, the landlord's motive is an important factor in any action
arising under these provisions. 6 In many cases, however, establishing a
landlord's motive is very difficult. 6 Recognizing this obstacle, several
states provide that the landlord's eviction of the tenant is presumed to be
retaliatory if it follows the tenant's protected act within a time period
specified in the statute." In other jurisdictions the tenant retains the burden of proving that the landlord's motive is retaliation.7 '
62. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6001 (Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 17001 (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN LAWS §§ 34-20-10, -11 (1970).
63. The statutes of fourteen jurisdictions include this provision. See, e.g., MASS, ANN.
LAWS ch. 186, § 18 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-5505 (1977); VA.
CODE § 55-248.39 (Supp. 1977).
64. The statutes of eleven jurisdictions include this provision. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit.
25, § 5516 (1975); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.02 (Baldwin Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §
91.865 (1975).
65. The statutes of twenty-four jurisdictions include this provision. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 83.60 (West Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1966); MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-208.1 (Supp. 1977).
66. The statutes of fourteen jurisdictions include this provision. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. §
58-2572 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 383.705(c) (Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1439 (1976).
67. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (West Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-7-39
(Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon 1977). See also Toms Point Apts. v.
Goudzward, 360 N.Y.S.2d 366, 367 (Sup, Ct. 1973).
68. See Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 240 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn. 1976) (landlord had burden of
proving nonretaliatory motive). See generally Comment, Landlord-Tenant: Proving Motive
in Retaliatory Eviction--Minnesota'sSolution, 61 MINN. L. REV. 523 (1977).
69. Landlords occasionally try to mask their primary motive by complaining of other
things. See Clore v. Fredman, 319 N.E.2d 18, 20 (Ill. 1974) (eviction allegedly necessary to
allow for upgrading physical condition of premises); Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 240 N.W.2d 828,
833 (Minn. 1976) (eviction allegedly due to insufficient funds check and tardiness in rent
payment); Cornell v. Dimmick, 342 N.Y.S.2d 275, 278 (Binghamton City Ct. 1973) (eviction
allegedly necessary to install new heater).
70. Eleven states provide this protection. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1491(c)(2)
(Supp. 1977) (six months); DEL. CODE tit. 25, § 5516 (1975) (ninety days); Ky. REV. STAT. §
383.705 (Supp. 1976) (one year).
71. See, e.g., Dickhut v. Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Wis. 1970) (sole motive); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1942.5(a) (Deering 1972) (dominant motive); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-33
(West 1978) (sole motive); cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (West Supp. 1977) (eviction was in
whole or in part a penalty for tenant's acts); R.I. GEN LAWS § 34-20-10(A) (1970) (eviction
must have been a penalty for tenant's acts).
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Retaliatory Eviction as a Cause of Action
Although it is generally recognized that a tenant may raise the defense
of retaliatory eviction,72 retaliatory eviction as a cause of action is not
widely recognized. 73 An exception to this general trend is the line of federal
cases in which tenants, asserting constitutional violations, have employed
federal statutes to recover damages for retaliatory eviction.74 The Civil
Rights Act of 1871 provides injunctive relief or damages to one who has
been deprived, under color of state law, of any rights protected under the
Constitution. 75 To qualify for the relief established by this statute, the
tenant must show that an act of the landlord has deprived him of a protected right and that some connection exists between the landlord's action
and state law. 71 As a result of these evidentiary requirements this cause of
action has had limited use.
RETALIATORY EVICTION

IN

TEXAS

Until recently, the rights of a tenant in Texas were controlled almost
entirely by common law doctrines. 77 The harshness of these doctrines was
mitigated to a certain extent by judicial recognition of the doctrine of
constructive eviction.7 1 In addition, the contractual nature of the lease has
been recognized, resulting in a statutory remedy for wrongful eviction for
72. See Comment, Landlord and Tenant--Prohibition of Retaliatory Eviction in
Landlord-Tenant Relations: A Study of Practice and Proposals, 54 N.C. L. REV. 861, 868
(1976).
73. See Aweeka v. Bonds, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650, 652 (App. Ct. 1971) (tenant allowed to
recover damages); Pohlman v. Metropolitan Trailer Park, Inc., 312 A.2d 888, 892 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Div. 1973) (tenants awarded compensatory damages).
74. See Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1972); McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d
781, 784-85 (1st Cir. 1971); Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501, 503 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
76. See Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1972); McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d
781, 784-85 (1st Cir. 1971). In at least two instances tenants have attempted to use 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 (1970) which provides for the recovery of damages when the injured party shows that
two or more persons conspired to deprive him of equal protection of the law. See Fallis v.
Dunbar, 386 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Mullarkey v. Borglum, 323 F. Supp. 1218,
1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Although neither case upheld the tenant's claim, the theoretical advantage of this approach is that in order to prevail the tenant need show only a conspiracy rather
than the existence of state action.
77. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Lorino, 124 Tex. 446, 452, 79 S.W.2d 307, 310 (1935) (lease is
grant of estate for a term of years); Cameron v. Calhoun-Smith Distrib. Co., 442 S.W.2d 815,
816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, no writ) (tenant remains liable for rent when premises
become unsuitable); Jackson v. Amador, 75 S.W.2d 892, 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1934,
writ dism'd) (no implied covenant of habitability).
78. See, e.g., Michaux v. Koebig, 555 S.W.2d 171, 177 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no
writ); Rust v. Eastex Oil Co., 511 S.W.2d 358, 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ);
Richker v. Georgandis, 323 S.W.2d 90, 95-96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
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tenants holding under a lease."9 A lessee facing wrongful eviction may
obtain a writ enjoining the landlord from taking such action,"' or may sue
to recover actual and punitive damages after a wrongful eviction has occurred ."
There has also been some improvement in the position of the periodic
tenant. The legislature, cognizant of the large number of substandard
dwellings in Texas, 2 enacted a statute that allows home-rule cities to
adopt ordinances which establish minimum standards of habitation, and
grants those cities the power to enforce such standards. 3 Most importantly, a recent supreme court decision has held that an implied warranty
of habitability exists in every rental agreement; 84 an assurance that the
residence is free from latent defects rendering it uninhabitable is implied
in every rental agreement."
79. See Rohrt v. Kelley Mfg. Co., 162 Tex. 534, 537-40, 349 S.W.2d 95, 97-99 (1961);
Warncke v. Tarbutton, 449 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, writ ref d
n.r.e.); Henson v. B & W Fin. Co., 401 S.W.2d 261, 264-65 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, no
writ); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236c (Vernon Supp. 1978).
80. See, e.g., Schnitzer v. Southwest Shoe Corp., 355 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1962), rev 'don other grounds, 364 S.W.2d 373 (1963); Obets & Harris v. Speed,
211 S.W. 316, 318 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1919, writ dism'd); Birchfield v. Bourland, 187
S.W. 422, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1916, no writ).
81. Bifano v. Econo Builders, Inc., 401 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). A lessee can recover damages which are shown to have been the foreseeable
consequence of the eviction. The measure of damages is the difference between the reasonable
value of the unexpired term of the lease and the amount agreed to be paid under the lease.
Id. at 677. A lessee can recover special damages if the landlord knew or should have known
that such damages would result from his act. Stafford v. Powell, 148 S.W.2d 965, 968 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1941, no writ). A lessee can recover punitive damages by showing fraud,
willfulness, malice or oppression with a showing of actual injury. Van Sickle v. Clark, 510
S.W.2d 664, 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ); see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 5236c (Vernon Supp. 1978).
82. In Texas substandard housing is not just an urban problem. Statistics from the Texas
Department of Community Affairs show the percentage of substandard, renter-occupied units
in different areas of Texas. In San Antonio, 12.9% of such units were substandard; in Dallas,
10.7%; Houston, 9.2%; East Texas, 29.3%; South Texas, 28.2%. See TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF
COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, TEXAS STATE HOUSING PLAN 25, April, 1978.
83. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1175, § 35 (Vernon Supp. 1978). The following
are examples of ordinances enacted under this statute: DALLAS, TEX., CODE ch. 27-3 (1976);
HOUSTON, TEX., CODE §§ 10-161 to 172 (1970); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE ch. 19A-1 (1972).
84. See Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 660-61 (Tex. 1978). An implied warranty
of habitability is a term of implied contract obligating the landlord to provide housing that
is fit for habitation. Id. at 317. See generally Comment, The Implied Warrantyof Habitability

in Landlord-Tenant Relationships: The Necessity of Application in Texas, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J.
64 (1973). Twenty-eight states recognized the implied warranty of habitability prior to its
adoption by Texas. See Blumberg & Robbins, Beyond URLTA: A Programfor Achieving Real
Tenant Goals, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 1, 7 n.28 (1976).
85. Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex. 1978); accord, Jack Spring, Inc. v.
Little, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (Ill.
1972); Steele v. Latimer, 521 P.2d 304, 309-10 (Kan. 1974).
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In Sims v. Century Kiest Apartments86 the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals
recognized the possible adverse effect which retaliatory eviction could have
upon these new developments.87 Faced with this problem for the first time,
the court held that to allow a landlord to evict a tenant in retaliation for
reporting housing code violations would violate public policy., Sims involved a tenant who, after his eviction, brought a suit for damages against
his landlord. 89 The court in Sims reasoned that it is wrongful for a landlord
to interfere with a tenant exercising his right to report violations." Consequently, if the tenant probably would not have been evicted if he had not
reported violations an action for damages will lie." Although the reasoning
of the court was based on well accepted authority," the court emphasized
that its holding was narrow in scope. 3 As a result the opinion leaves many
questions unanswered.
The majority, for example, held that this decision did not condone the
use of retaliatory eviction as a defense in a forcible detainer case. 4 The
reasoning behind this limitation was that a forcible detainer proceeding is
not the proper proceeding in which to determine the wrongfulness of an
eviction;9" the primary purpose of a forcible detainer suit is to determine
who has the right of immediate possession." While the scope of a forcible detainer suit is statutorily limited,97 the right to possession, contrary
86. 567 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
87. Id. at 531.
88. Id. at 532.
89. Id. at 527.
90. Id. at 532. The court pointed out that it would be violative of public policy to allow
a landlord to inhibit reports of violations of a housing code by persons for whose benefit the
code was enacted. Id. at 531.
91. Id. at 532. The burden of proof is on the tenant to prove he "probably" would not
have been evicted had he not reported code violations. Id. at 532.
92. See, e.g., In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884);
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
93. Sims v. Century Kiest Apts., 567 S.W.2d 526, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no
writ).
94. Id. at 532. A forcible entry and detainer action is the method provided by statute
through which a landlord can lawfully regain possession of rental property. See TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN.

art. 3992 (Vernon 1972).

95. Sims v. Century Kiest Apts., 567 S.W.2d 526, 531-32 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978,
no writ).
96. See, e.g., Haginas v. Malbis Memorial Foundation, 163 Tex. 274, 277, 354 S.W.2d
368, 371 (1962); Johnson v. Highland Hills Drive Apts., 552 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dews v. Floyd, 413 S.W.2d 800, 805 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1967, no writ).
97. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 738-755. Most significantly, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3992
(Vernon 1972) provides that the judgment of the county court shall be conclusive of the issue
of right to possession. See also Lincoln Square Apts. v. Davis, 295 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1968) (forcible entry and detainer action not proper forum to determine constitutionality of retaliatory eviction).
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to the view espoused by the Sims court, cannot properly be determined
without considering the wrongfulness of the eviction." The limitations of
a forcible detainer suit should not prevent a tenant from raising a valid
defense to a landlord's suit for ejectment, especially considering the difficulty an impecunious tenant will encounter in finding another place to
live." Although the tenant may be entitled to damages in a subsequent
suit, he should be allowed the more immediate recourse of raising the
defense of retaliatory eviction. The possibility of receiving damages in the
future is small consolation to the evicted tenant whose immediate concern
is securing a place to live.'"
STATUTORY PROPOSAL

The most effective way to properly balance the conflicting interests of
the landlord and tenant would be to enact a statute which would provide
a clear definition of the elements of a defense and a cause of action for
retaliatory eviction.'0 ' The following discussion sets forth a statutory proposal based on the statutes presently in effect in other jurisdictions and
the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.' 2 All of the current
statutes provide a defense for the tenant in a suit by the landlord for
possession.' 3 Few statutes, however, provide a remedy for the tenant who
has already been evicted.' 4 Since the indigent tenant is less likely to be
familiar with the relevant laws,' °5 a statute should provide both a defense
for the tenant still in possession and a cause of action for the tenant who
was evicted prior to learning of his right to a defense. '
98. Schoshinski, Remedies for the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor Change, 54 GEo. L.J.
519, 551 (1966).
99. See Garrity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an Urban Society, 46 J. URB.
L. 695, 698 (1969).
100. See Schoshinski, Remedies for the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor Change, 54 GEo.
L.J. 519, 551 (1966). The acute housing shortage makes such a remedy of no practical value
for a large percentage of urban dwellers. Id. at 551.
101. Sims v. Century Kiest Apts., 567 S.W.2d 526, 533 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978,
no writ).
102. See generally MRLTC, supra note 10, § 2-407; URLTA, supra note 62, § 5.101. State
Senator Carlos Truan of Corpus Christi introduced S.B. 315 during the 65th legislative session
in 1977. It included provisions making retaliatory eviction a defense similar to those in
URLTA. See TEx. S.J. 108-09 (1977). The bill did not get past the committee.
103. See statutes cited note 56 supra.
104. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 33-1491(B) (Supp. 1977); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 186, §
18 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.02 (Baldwin Supp. 1977).
But see DEL. CODE tit. 25, § 5516(d) (1975) (tenant allowed three times actual damages or
three months' rent, and cost of suit); HAW. REV. STAT. § 521-74(c) (1976) (tenant, if dispossessed, allowed actual damages and cost of suit); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.240, .250
(tenant allowed cost of suit or arbitration, including attorney's fees).
105. See K. CLARK, DARK GHErro 56 (1965).
106. See Schoshinski, Remedies for the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor Change, 54 GEo.
L.J. 519. 541-52 (1966).
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Because the tenant in Sims was evicted for participating in a tenant's
council and reporting violations of the housing code, these are the only acts
protected under the present Texas law.' 7 To provide effective protection
for tenants, a statute should be broader in scope. Tenants have been
evicted for a wide variety of acts, ranging from refusal to cooperate in a
scheme to violate antitrust laws'08 to agitation of other tenants.'0 9 The
tenant's acts which ought to be protected, however, are those directed
towards legitimately maintaining the habitable condition of the dwelling"
and reporting violations of the law."'
Most statutes provide that a tenant may not assert the defense of retaliatory eviction if he is delinquent in rent payments. ' 2 Generally, such a
provision is equitable since a tenant should not be permitted to remain in
possession of an apartment if he is not paying rent. Yet there are some
situations in which a tenant should be permitted to withhold rent lawfully." 3 An effective statute, therefore, should contain a provision permitting a tenant to raise retaliation as a defense when he has withheld rent
in an attempt to force his landlord to correct conditions which have rendered the dwelling unit uninhabitable, or when he has made a long requested repair himself and has deducted the cost from his rent. ' The
107. See Sims v. Century Kiest Apts., 567 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978,
no writ).
108. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 370 N.Y.S.2d 943, 945 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
109. See Evans v. Rose, 182 S.E.2d 591, 593 (N.C. App. 1971) (defense of retaliation for
airing grievances irrelevant to landlord's right to recover possession); Lincoln Fin. Corp. v.
Ferrier, 567 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah 1977) (allegations of retaliation for agitating other tenants
no defense in suit for eviction).
110. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310 (1976); KAN. STAT. § 58-2572 (1976); OR. REV.
STAT. § 91.865 (1975).
111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 13.9, commentary (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1976). All of the statutes now in existence provide protection for a tenant who is evicted in
retaliation for reporting housing code violations. Id.
112. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 383.705 (Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1439 (1976);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2854 (1976).
113. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082-83 (D.C. Cir.) (tenant
allowed to withhold rent on uninhabitable apartment), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970);
Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97, 99, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729, 731 (1970) (tenant allowed
to repair and deduct cost from rent payments). But see Coburn v. Moore, 538 S:W.2d 137,
138-39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ) (tenant evicted for withholding rent on uninhabitable apartment).
114. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942.5(a)(1) (West Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700I (Purdon 1977); MRLTC, supra note 10, § 2-407(1). Such a provision would require codification of a repair and deduct statute in Texas. The right of a tenant to repair and deduct the
cost of repairs from his rent has been recognized when the landlord has expressly covenanted
to repair. See McCrory v. Nacol, 428 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968, writ
refd n.r.e.). In light of the recognition of an implied warranty of habitability, the legislature
should extend the availability of the repair and deduct remedy to all tenants. Several other
jurisdictions have enacted statutes providing this remedy. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942
(Deering 1972); DEL. CODE tit. 25, §§ 5306-07 (1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 32 (West
1951).
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uninhabitable condition of the dwelling may be caused by such intentional
acts of the landlord as decreasing the water pressure, or discontinuing the
heat and electricity. Recognizing this, a cause of action should exist following a landlord's retaliatory attempt to constructively evict a tenant. ' ' A
tenant should also be protected when the landlord has raised the rent in
retaliation. Otherwise a landlord could circumvent the statute by raising
the rent to an unreasonable amount and then legally evicting the tenant
because he was in arrears." '
The burden of proving the motive of the landlord is another factor which
should be addressed in such a statute. The Sims decision, dealing with
7
retaliatory eviction as a cause of action, places the burden on the tenant.,
In other jurisdictions, a significant number of statutes that provide for
retaliation as a defense, place the burden on the landlord to prove that the
eviction was not retaliatory. "I In view of the difficulty involved in proving
the landlord's motive, when retaliation is raised as a defense or a cause of
action," 9 the most equitable solution in both situations, is to create a
rebuttable presumption' 0 that the eviction is retaliatory if notice to quit
is served within a specified period after the protected act of the tenant
occurs. The presumption can be overcome by proving that the landlord's
decision to evict was motivated by a legitimate business purpose, independent of any consideration of the protected activities of the tenant.''
The Sims decision did not determine whether retaliatory eviction, when
alleged as a cause of action, is an action in contract or in tort.',2 As a
115. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-7-39 (Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.02
(Baldwin Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.865 (1975).
116. Raising the rent to a prohibitive amount is a common tactic of retaliating landlords.
See Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97, 99, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729, 731 (1970); E. & E.
Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 281 A.2d 544, 545 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971).
117. See Sims v. Century Kiest Apts., 567 S.W.2d 526, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978,
no writ). Several other jurisdictions place the burden on the tenant to prove that retaliation
played a certain role in the landlord's decision to evict. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942.5 (Deering
1972) (retaliation was landlord's dominant purpose); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-33 (West
1978) (retaliation was landlord's sole purpose).
118. The statutes in eleven jurisdictions place the burden of proof on the landlord. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1491B (Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 25, § 5516(b) (1977); Ky. REV.
STAT § 383.705 (Supp. 1976). See also MRLTC, supra note 10, § 2-407(1).
119. See generally Comment, Landlord-Tenant: Proving Motive in Retaliatory Eviction-Minnesota'sSolution, 61 MINN. L. REV. 523 (1977).
120. See generally C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 53 (1956). A

presumption may relieve one of the duty of presenting .evidence, but the presumption may
be overcome by positive evidence from the opposing party. Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Muegge,
135 Tex. 520, 529, 143 S.W.2d 763, 768 (1940).
121. E.g., Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Parkin
v. Fitzgerald, 240 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn. 1976); Silberg v. Lipscomb, 285 A.2d 88 (N.J.
1971); cf. Appelstein v. Quinn, 281 N.E.2d 228, 229 (Mass. 1972) (landlord prevailed after
making good faith rent increase).
122. Sims v. Century Kiest Apts., 567 S.W.2d 526, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978,
no writ).
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consequence it is uncertain whether the two year'23 or the four year'24 statprobute of limitations will apply in such a situation. To avoid limitation25
1
lems any statute in this area should delineate a limitations period.
Another issue raised but not answered by the Sims decision concerns the
damages recoverable by the wrongfully evicted tenant. 2 ' In Texas, a lessee
who has been wrongfully evicted can recover both actual and punitive
damages.'27 In other jurisdictions these damages are available to tenants
who have been evicted in retaliation. 2 ' Because Texas law has determined
retaliatory eviction to be wrongful,12 9 the same remedies available to the
wrongfully evicted lessee should be given the tenant who is wrongfully
evicted in retaliation.
In considering the issue of damages, the legislature should also weigh the
extent to which a tenant is protected by the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(DTPA).'1 Leased property is included in the Act's definition of goods 13'
and failure by any person to comply with an express or implied warranty
is defined as a deceptive act. 132 Since Texas now recognizes an implied
warranty of habitability in every residential rental agreement, 1 3 it seems
likely that leasing or maintaining an uninhabitable dwelling is a deceptive
act. A tenant who is paying rent for an uninhabitable dwelling, therefore,
will likely have an action against his landlord under the DTPA."4 The
123. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon 1958).
124. Id. art. 5527.
125. Cf. id. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (limitations on health care liability
claims). Prior to the enactment of this statute it was unclear whether tort or contract limitations were applicable when injuries were sustained by health care patients. See Huizar v. Four
Seasons Nursing Centers, 562 S.W.2d 264, 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio), dismissed as
moot, 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 450 (July 5, 1978).
126. See Sims v. Century Kiest Apts., 567 S.W.2d 526, 532-33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1978, no writ).
127. See Van Sickle v. Clark, 510 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974,
no writ) (tenant recovered punitive damages); Bifano v. Econo Builders, Inc., 401 S.W.2d 670,
677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, writ refd n.r.e.) (tenant recovered actual damages). In
Sims the tenant sought recovery for his moving expenses, the additional rent he paid for a
comparable dwelling, punitive damages, and attorney fees. Sims v. Century Kiest Apts., 567
S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
128. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1491B (Supp. 1977) (two months' rent plus twice
actual damages); DEL. CODE tit. 25, § 5516 (1975) (three times actual damages or three
months' rent, plus cost of suit); Ky. REV. STAT. § 383.705 (Supp. 1976) (maximum three
months' rent plus attorney fees).
129. Sims v. Century Kiest Apts., 567 S.W.2d 526, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978,
no writ).
130. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (Vernon Supp. 1978). See generally Comment,
Texas Landlord-Tenant Law And the Deceptive Trade PracticesAct-Affirmative Remedies
for the Tenant, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 807 (1977).
131. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (1) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
132. Id. § 17.50(a)(2).
133. Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 660-61 (Tex. 1978).
134. See Comment, Texas Landlord-Tenant Law and the Deceptive Trade Practices
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DTPA, however, provides relief only to tenants who have resided in uninhabitable dwellings. It is possible that a tenant could be evicted from
a dwelling that is habitable for reporting a minor code violation or for
exercising other protected rights.'35 The statute must recognize a cause
of action in favor of a tenant evicted from a habitable, as well as from an
uninhabitable dwelling, if the eviction was retaliatory. 3 '
While the impetus for recent legislation in the landlord-tenant area has
originated primarily from an interest in protecting the tenant, the rights
of the landlord must not go unguarded. Recognizing that in some cases the
uninhabitable condition of a dwelling may be in part attributable to the
willful acts of the tenant,'37 the landlord should not be absolutely barred
from evicting a tenant.'38 Rather, the landlord should be permitted to make
good faith rent increases
and evictions when necessary without incurring
3
1

liability for damages.

1

Any statute in this area of the law should impose a good faith requirement on both parties. 4 " Implicit in every decision allowing the defense of
retaliatory eviction has been the recognition that the landlord has acted
in bad faith toward the tenant."' As in any business transaction, a good
faith determination is essential to an equitable resolution of the dispute.,
In essence, the main issue to be settled in any suit concerning retaliatory
eviction is the good faith of the parties.' If the tenant acted in bad faith
in reporting code violations or in creating the violations, he should not be
Act--Affirmative Remedies for the Tenant, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 807, 812-22 (1977).
135. See Church v. Allen Meadows Apts., 329 N.Y.S.2d 148, 149 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
136. See MRLTC, supra note 10, § 2-407(3).
137. Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869, 873 (1967).
138. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310 (1976); Aaiz. REV. STAT. § 33-1381 (Supp. 1977);
DEL. CODE tit. 25, § 5516 (1977).
139. See KAN. STAT. § 58-2572 (1976). The MRLTC provides that the landlord can
recover possession of the dwelling unit, notwithstanding a protected act of the tenant, if: (1)
the tenant is committing waste or violating the rental agreement; (2) the landlord seeks in
good faith to recover possession of the unit for his own use, for the purpose of remodeling, or
to terminate use as a dwelling unit; (3) the dwelling unit was in compliance with housing
codes on date of complaint; (4) the landlord has contracted to sell the property; (5) the
landlord's notice to quit was given prior to a complaint. MRLTC, supra note 10, § 2-407(2).
140. MRLTC, supra note 10, § 2-407; cf. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 4(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1978) (presumption of bad faith if landlord fails to return security deposit).
141. See Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 240 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn. 1976); cf. Garfield v. Mayflower Equities, 327 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (App. Term 1971) (bad faith gives rise to implied right
of action under Rent Stabilization Law); Queenan v. Frishwasser, 314 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880-81
(App. Div. 1970) (landlord's good faith in evicting required reversal of judgment for tenant),
aff'd, 276 N.E.2d 227, 326 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1971).
142. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.102(c) (Tex. UCC 1968).
143. Several statutes require a showing of good faith to prevail. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 540.13-b (1975); R.I. GEN LAWS § 34-20-10 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.240
(Supp. 1976).
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permitted to prevail."' If the landlord acted in bad faith in evicting a
tenant in retaliation, he should not be allowed to obtain possession." '
Further, in a suit to recover damages a showing of bad faith should raise a
presumption in favor of the tenant.
CONCLUSION

The legal power of the landlord to evict a periodic tenant for any or no
reason has long been protected as a necessary incident of the property
owner's right to rent to whom he chooses. At the same time, tenants must
be protected from abuses of this power. Eviction is frequently used by the
landlord to rid himself of troublesome tenants. If the acts of the tenant are
proscribed by the lease, the law, or by common decency, the eviction is
justified. On the other hand, a tenant may be troublesome because he is
attempting to improve the condition of his dwelling through legally protected means. Such tenants will be protected under this proposed statute.
In response to the public policy of providing adequate housing, landlordtenant law has undergone important changes. Sims evidences the continuing trend of Texas law to protect tenants, particularly low income tenants,
with whom the disparity in the bargaining power between landlord and
tenant is greatest. Clear definition of the cause of action and the defense
of retaliatory eviction is necessary to further reduce that disparity. While
judicial decision-making might eventually define these matters, expeditious legislation will more properly balance the interests of both the landlord and the tenant.
144. Several statutes allow the landlord to evict a tenant who has reported code violations if the violation was caused primarily by the lack of ordinary care of the tenant. See,
e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 383.705 (Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1439 (1977); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 91.865(3)(a) (1975).
145. See generally Comment, Retaliatory Evictions: A Study of Existing Law and Proposed Model Code, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 537 (1969).
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